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U.S. Rushes to Evacuate Afghan Translators However Leaves Many in Limbo

Another 4,000 Afghans who worked with American forces, many of them interpreters, were allowed to move with their families to the United States given the withdrawal of US troops, State Department officials said on Wednesday.

But officials added that evacuations were only from Kabul, the capital, and any eligible Afghans in remote areas would find out on their own how to tackle the difficult and likely dangerous journey if they wanted to take advantage of the offer.

“To come on an evacuation flight, they would have to go to Kabul,” said a senior official, who requested anonymity to discuss the plan in detail, when he called reporters. “Of course we don’t have an extensive US military presence. We don’t have the opportunity to transport them. “

“If you are in the north of the country and do not feel safe in Afghanistan, you could go to a neighboring country” and complete your application process there, the official added.

The United States will also fail to provide security to applicants outside of Kabul, many of whom are directly threatened by the Taliban for cooperating with coalition forces during the war.

With the American military in the final stages of withdrawing from Afghanistan, pressure has come on the White House to protect Afghan allies and expedite the provision of special immigrant visas for them, and President Biden has promised to do so. There were approximately 20,000 applicants for the special visa program.

This month, 2,500 Afghans will be gradually sent to an army base in Fort Lee, Virginia, south of Richmond, where they will wait approximately 10 days for final processing. The next 4,000 applicants who require additional permits will travel to other countries with their families to complete the visa process before entering the U.S., the senior official said.

The officer did not specify which countries these applicants would be sent to to complete the visa process.

The House of Representatives is expected to pass a bill this week that will increase the number of State Department’s special immigrant visas and streamline the application process.

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In Taliban-Managed Areas, Afghan Women Are Fleeing for an Training

Two districts in northwest Afghanistan offer a glimpse into life under the Taliban, who completely stopped education for teenage girls.

May 17, 2021

SHEBERGHAN, Afghanistan – At a meeting with village elders in the mosque, the order to close the girls’ schools was announced. The messages were filtered through the teachers in muted meetings at the students’ homes. Or came in a brief letter to the local school principal.

Appeals to the Taliban, arguments and requests were useless. Three years ago, girls over the age of 12 stopped taking classes in the two rural districts south of this low provincial capital in northwestern Afghanistan. Up to 6,000 girls were forced out of school overnight. Male teachers were suddenly dismissed: what they had done to give girls an education was against Islam, the Taliban said.

Across Afghanistan, the orders were similar to those given just 40 miles south of the capital of Jowzjan Province. In districts controlled by the Taliban, with few exceptions, there is no longer any schooling for all but the youngest girls. The Taliban’s message: teenage girls should be at home and help their mothers.

“I couldn’t go to school for two years,” said 16-year-old Farida, who was kicked out of school in the Darzab district at the age of 12 and was a refugee here in the provincial capital at the age of 14 My sister, who told me that there would be no more school – she is a teacher, ”said Farida. “So I was at home helping my mother with the housework.”

The schools in Sheberghan all have their share of teenage female refugees traveling north from Taliban-controlled areas to stay with relatives.

“I told my family,” I really, really want to go to college, “said 16-year-old Nabila, who came to Sheberghan with her mother from Darzab two years ago.” Maybe they’re just afraid of women. “

The reluctant consent of local people offers a glimpse into the lives of Afghans everywhere if the current slow collapse of state forces continues. Every day brings bad news about the rising uprising: more bases are overrun, districts conquered, outposts handed over and government employees and journalists murdered. Since May 1, when the United States officially began withdrawing, the Taliban have taken territory in virtually all parts of the country.

And over the weekend, a triple bomb attack on a school in the Afghan capital, Kabul, killed dozens of schoolgirls. While the Taliban denied responsibility, the perpetrator sent a clear signal: Education for girls will not be tolerated.

But the future has already arrived in the south of Jowzjan Province. The parallel universe that is the lot of many Afghans today is a living reality for the province’s education officials and teachers. With grim resignation they have to grapple with the fate of their neighbors who live nearby and yet on the other side of the mirror.

The Taliban control the districts of Qosh Tepa and Darzab – drought-stricken and impoverished agricultural areas that are home to around 70,000 people – and all 21 schools in these districts. They took command in 2018 after fierce fighting with local Taliban apostates who had declared allegiance to the Islamic State, as well as with government troops.

Despite the Taliban’s control, the district teachers trudge to Sheberghan, the provincial capital, every month to collect their salaries. This is one of many anomalies in a country that is already de facto controlled by two governments. It is better to have to pay teachers than to close schools. The dusty but busy city is still in the hands of the central government, but like other provincial capitals, it is an isolated island. The Taliban rule the streets, come and go.

The provincial government still employs headmasters for the conquered districts. But local education officials watch helplessly as Islamist insurgents add a large dose of religion to the curriculum, slash history classes and keep the girls away.

The teachers were fired. The Taliban use free government textbooks but strictly monitor their use and ensure that those who study Islam receive intensive training. And they punish teachers who don’t show up for work and tie up their wages. There are no days off. The Taliban have accused teachers in these districts of spying and shaving their beards.

“If we don’t obey them, we will be punished,” Jowzjan Education Director Abdul Rahim Salar remembered the teachers and school principals who told him. “They were worried about their lives.”

For the girls fleeing to Sheberghan to continue their education, there is a sense of a confusing fate that is imposed and narrowly avoided by the Taliban. Nilofar Amini, 17, said she missed the school she was expelled from three years ago. She had only arrived here in the provincial capital four days earlier.

“I want to be brought up,” said Ms. Amini, sitting with relatives in a room in an abandoned shopping mall.

Her high-pitched voice was muffled by the light blue burqa that the Taliban themselves imposed on teenagers – she wore it out of habit but removed it after the interview. Ms. Amini described her life since she was banned from school: “I sewed, made kilim rugs, handicrafts.”

She added, “The girls stay inside all day. You can’t even visit relatives. “The Taliban destroyed the cell phone towers; No chatting on phones.

Ms. Amini’s father, Nizamuddin, a farmer who sat next to her in the mall, pointed out the consequences of the Taliban’s restrictions on the education of girls: “I am illiterate. It’s like I’m blind I have to be led by others. That’s why I want my daughters to be raised. “

The Taliban’s educational policy for girls can vary slightly. Local commanders make the decisions, reflecting the decentralization of a movement that scientists like Antonio Giustozzi have called the “network of networks”. Human Rights Watch found in a report last year that while Taliban commanders often allow girls to go to school until the age of 12, it is unusual for them to allow older girls to do so. In some areas, “community pressure has pushed commanders to give girls better access to education,” the report said.

But not many. And not in this part of Afghanistan.

A teacher in the district, whose three teenage daughters are now excluded from school, said, “The situation is bad and I feel bad for her. You have nothing to do. “He added that his daughters only help their mother with household chores.

The teacher, who had met at the headquarters of the provincial school in Sheberghan, where he had collected his salary, asked not to use his name for fear of retaliation from the Taliban. He said his daughters keep asking when they can return to school.

“They didn’t let us study any longer,” said Fatima Qaisari, 15, in a dusty camp for refugees from neighboring Faryab province. She was 12 when her school closed.

Education officials describe an environment of oppression in which residents, parents and teachers have no opportunity to weigh up the strict and strict policies of the Taliban.

“We have been in contact with them many times. But there was no result, ”said Abdel Majid, the headmaster in Darzab.

“They tell us,“ Our government doesn’t want us to teach girls, ”he said.“ Nobody can disobey them. ”The Islamic state faction demolished some of its schools; others have no windows.

First, Mr. Majid told many girls to “play a game” with the Taliban and pretend they were younger than the minimum age. “After a year they warned me to stop,” he said.

He and others were told that girls’ schools would remain closed, at least until the emergence of what Taliban officials portray to confused residents as the insurgent grail: a top-down “Islamic system” where there may be such a place for the education of girls.

Shaiasta Haidari, the finance director of Jowzjan Province schools, said officials had sent a letter alerting Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to the situation. “Nothing happened,” she said. “Of course I’m not happy.”

Not far away at the Marshal Dostum School – named after General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a former vice president and local warlord whose portrait hangs across the city – a handful of girls from Taliban-controlled districts are trying to make up for lost ground. One recent morning, streams of her schoolmates, laughing girls in black and white uniforms, streamed past the blooming grounds to start the school day.

In the director’s office, some of the refugees from Darzab and Qosh Tepa were amazed at the futility of the Taliban’s decision to expel them from school. Some said they wanted to be teachers; One girl was hoping to study engineering.

16-year-old Farida shook her head. “Your decision makes no sense. It’s not even logical. “

Nabila, the teenager from Darzab, added: “The Taliban do not have the sense to know that it is important for girls to go to school.”

Fatima Faizi and Kiana Hayeri contributed to the coverage.

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Spy Businesses Search New Afghan Allies as U.S. Withdraws

KABUL, Afghanistan – Western espionage agencies are evaluating and soliciting regional leaders outside the Afghan government who may be able to provide intelligence on terrorist threats long after US forces have withdrawn, according to current and former American, European and Afghan officials.

The effort marks a turning point in the war. Instead of one of the largest multinational military training missions of all time, informants and intelligence agencies are now being sought. Despite diplomats saying the Afghan government and its security forces will be able to hold their own, the move signals that Western intelligence agencies are focusing on the possible – or even probable – collapse of the central government and an inevitable return to civil war to prepare.

Court officials in Afghanistan recall the 1980s and 1990s when the country was controlled by the Soviets and then turned into a factional conflict between regional leaders. The West was often dependent on opposing warlords – and at times supported them financially through relationships that contradicted the Afghan people. As a result of these policies, the United States was often particularly indebted to brokers who had outrageously committed human rights abuses.

Candidates considered today for intelligence gathering include the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the famous Afghan fighter who led fighters against the Soviets in the 1980s and as head of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban for the following decade . The son – Ahmad Massoud, 32 – has tried in recent years to revive his father’s work by assembling a coalition of militias to defend northern Afghanistan.

Afghans, American and European officials say there is no formal cooperation between Mr Massoud and Western intelligence, although some have held preliminary meetings. While there is widespread agreement within the CIA and the French DGSE that it could provide information, opinions differ as to whether Mr Massoud, who has not been tested as a leader, would be able to command an effective resistance.

The appeal of developing relationships with Mr Massoud and other regional energy brokers is obvious: Western governments distrust the Taliban’s lukewarm commitments to keep terrorist groups out of the country in the years to come, and fear that if they don’t, the Afghan government could collapse Peace settlement is achieved. The Second Resistance, as Mr Massoud now calls his armed insurgent force, is a network that opposes the Taliban, Al-Qaeda or any extremist group that emerges from their shadow.

Senior CIA officials, including William J. Burns, the agency’s director, have confirmed that they will be looking for new ways to gather information in Afghanistan once American forces have withdrawn and that their ability to gather information about terrorist activity will increase collect is restricted.

But Mr Massoud’s organization is still in its infancy, desperate for support and legitimacy. It is supported by around a dozen militia commanders who have fought against the Taliban and the Soviets in the past, as well as several thousand fighters in the north. Mr Massoud says his ranks are occupied by those who have been insulted by the government and, like the Taliban, believes that Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has exceeded his greeting.

“We are ready, even if it takes my own life,” said Massoud in an interview.

Even the symbols at Mr. Massoud’s events are reminiscent of the time of the Civil War: old flags of the Northern Alliance and the old national anthem.

But despite all the excitement of Mr Massoud at the recent rallies and ceremonies, the idea that the Northern Alliance could be renamed and that its former leaders – some of whom have now become ambassadors, vice-presidents and senior military commanders in the Afghan government – would follow someone who is half his age and has little experience with war on the battlefield seems unrealistic right now, security analysts have said.

Supporting any kind of insurgency or building a resistance movement presents real challenges today, said Lisa Maddox, a former CIA analyst who has done extensive work on Afghanistan.

“The concern is what would the second resistance involve and what would our goals be?” She said. “I’m afraid people are proposing a new proxy war in Afghanistan. I think we learned that we can’t win. “

Even considering that an unproven militia leader for possible counter-terrorism assurances upon withdrawal of international forces is undermining the last two decades of state-building, security analysts say, practically turning the idea of ​​an impending civil war into an expected reality by further strengthening anti-government forces . Such divisions are widespread for exploitation by the Taliban.

The United States had a close relationship with the Northern Alliance, which made it difficult to gather information in the country. The French and British both supported high-ranking Massoud in the 1980s, while the Americans instead focused primarily on groups associated with Pakistani intelligence. CIA links with Mr. Massoud and his group were limited until 1996 when the agency began providing logistical assistance in exchange for information about al-Qaeda.

One of the reasons the CIA kept Massoud at bay was his track record of unreliability, drug trafficking, and war atrocities in the early 1990s, when Mr. Massoud’s forces shot at Kabul and massacred civilians as other warlords did.

Now different allied governments and officials have different views on Mr. Massoud and the viability of his movement. The French, who were devoted supporters of his father, see his efforts as promising to put up real resistance to the control of the Taliban.

David Martinon, the French ambassador in Kabul, said he had been watching Mr Massoud closely for the past three years and nominated him for a trip to Paris to meet with French leaders, including the president. “He’s smart, passionate, and a man of integrity who is dedicated to his country,” said Martinon.

Washington is more divided, and some government analysts do not believe Mr Massoud would be able to build an effective coalition.

Eighteen months ago, Lisa Curtis, then a National Security Council official, met with Mr. Massoud, along with Zalmay Khalilzad, the leading US diplomat who led peace efforts with the Taliban. She described him as charismatic and said he spoke convincingly about the importance of democratic values. “He’s very clear and talks about the importance of maintaining the progress made over the past 20 years,” she said.

In Afghanistan, some are more skeptical of Mr Massoud’s power to influence a resistance.

“Practical experience has shown that no one can be like his father,” said Lieutenant General Mirza Mohammad Yarmand, a former deputy minister in the Ministry of the Interior. “His son lives in a different time and does not have the experience that his father matured.”

Other members of the Afghan government see Mr. Massoud as a nuisance, someone who has the potential to create problems for his own interests in the future.

While opinions differ on his organizational skills, there is broad consensus that Mr Massoud can help act as eyes and ears for the West – as his father did 20 years ago.

Mr Massoud, who was trained at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, UK, returned to Afghanistan in 2016. He spent the next three years quietly building support before becoming more public in 2019 through rallies and recruiting campaigns across the north.

In recent months, Mr Massoud’s rhetoric has grown tougher when he recently attacked Mr Ghani during a ceremony in Kabul and his efforts to secure international support became more aggressive. Not only has Mr. Massoud reached the US, UK and France, but also courted India, Iran and Russia, according to people familiar with his activities. Afghan intelligence documents show that Mr Massoud is buying weapons from Russia through an intermediary.

But Europe and the United States see him less as a bulwark against a rising Taliban than as a potentially important observer of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. A generation ago, Mr. Massoud’s father was open about the burgeoning terrorist threats in the country. And even if the son cannot command the same armed forces as his father, he may be able to issue similar warnings.

As a young diplomat, Mr Martinon recalls Massoud’s late warning to the world during his visit to France in April 2001.

“What he said was caution, caution,” recalled Mr. Martinon. “The Taliban are hosting Al-Qaeda and preparing something.”

Julian E. Barnes reported from Washington. Najim Rahim and Fatima Faizi reported from Kabul.

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European Courtroom Backs Germany in Case Over 2009 Killings of Afghan Civilians

BERLIN – The European Court of Human Rights ruled in favor of Germany on Tuesday in a dispute with Afghan civilians who questioned the country’s investigation into an attack on oil tankers in Afghanistan in 2009 that killed up to 90 civilians.

In its ruling, the Strasbourg, France-based court found that the German investigation into the bombing did not violate the European Convention on Human Rights.

On the night of the attack, Taliban fighters hijacked two tankers carrying NATO fuel, but they were stranded on a sandbar in the Kunduz River, about four miles from the NATO base in Kunduz, Afghanistan.

Colonel Georg Klein, who was serving as the commander of the NATO base in Kunduz at the time, called US military planes to bomb the tankers. He believed that there were only insurgents in the area and feared the Taliban might use them to carry out attacks. But dozens of local Afghans had flooded the tanks after the Taliban invited them to suck up fuel. An investigation by the German army later found that up to 90 civilians had been killed.

Abdul Hanan, who lost his sons Abdul Bayan (12) and Nesarullah (8) as part of the NATO air strike ordered by Colonel Klein on September 3, 2009, brought the case to the European court after several complaints in the German judicial system.

The court found that the Federal Prosecutor’s Office decision to close an investigation into the commanding general was justified “because at the time the airstrike was ordered he was convinced that no civilians were present at the scene of the attack”.

The German Bundestag carried out a public investigation into the bombing, which was also contested in several German courts. Mr. Hanan had argued that Germany was protecting Colonel Klein and others whom he claimed were responsible for covering up the air strike.

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Afghan Leaders Sideline Spokesmen in an Escalating Misinformation Conflict

KABUL, Afghanistan – After seeing the wounded children in the hospital and learning of the Afghan air strike that took them there and killing nine others their age in northern Afghanistan, Ahmad Jawad Hijri never expected his reaction to land him in jail.

But Mr. Hijri, then the spokesman for the governor of Takhar Province, was arrested, detained for three days, and then released after telling the news media what happened – a standard part of his role that he had played many times. Senior officials in Kabul insisted that only Taliban fighters were killed on strike, not children, and that anyone who said otherwise should be prosecuted.

“I saw the wounded children in the hospital,” said Mr. Hijri. “I didn’t make a mistake.”

The war in Afghanistan has long been one of the competing narratives. However, the government’s response to the October 22 strike in Takhar province signaled a change in tactics by President Ashraf Ghani’s government: an obvious declaration of willingness to suppress and deny information about innocent deaths. It also highlighted the changing political landscape as Qatar peace negotiations continue and the Taliban seek to capitalize on the attention they are attracting on the world stage.

The news that defined the first years of the war, when both sides struggled to win Afghan hearts and minds, has almost stopped. That leaves its main actors – the United States, the Taliban, and the government – all testing different communication strategies to achieve their desired goals.

But with Americans potentially pulling out of the country in the coming months, the Afghan government – inundated with Taliban attacks, falling morale among its security forces, and waves of targeted murders across the country – has only shrunk to portray itself as a bastion of democratic values.

According to experts, the October air strike was a turning point for the Afghan government. Even the right to accountability shifted to outright condemnation of those who violated the government’s bottom line, probably for fear of further losing their public position.

The fallout has only encouraged the Taliban, who wish to prove themselves capable of leading Afghanistan better than current leaders, who are increasingly losing credibility.

The Afghan government is “so afraid of criticism that it is unwilling to admit mistakes or hold itself accountable,” said Patricia Gossman, deputy Asia director for Human Rights Watch. “It’s ultimately self-destructive, but they really want to control information.”

At the beginning of the war, the Afghan government was reluctant to face civilian casualties caused by the coalition or by Afghan forces, often promising to investigate but offering results that were rarely made public. But at least the episodes were recognized and local officials from areas where civilians were wounded or killed were allowed to speak about them freely.

The Taliban have used civil death as a propaganda tool for the entire war, pointing out air strikes and night strikes by the US and NATO as blatant crimes against the Afghan people. But as Western forces reduced their presence and the Afghan forces turned their own weapons against the insurgent group, the resulting air strikes and misdirected artillery fire that wounded and killed innocents became an increasingly powerful propaganda tool, this time directly on the Afghan government.

An example of this was photos of dead civilians and destroyed property posted on Twitter last week by a Taliban spokesman, highlighting them as war crimes committed by the Afghan and US military. Such images are often catalysts for public outcry that goes both ways: the government is accused of failing to protect its people and the Taliban for its unwavering commitment to violence.

When the Taliban expanded their propaganda distribution, the Afghan government intensified official dialogue with the public. Since October, the Ghani government has been silencing provincial spokesmen and district governors and demanding that they stop relaying information to the news media, several Afghan officials from several provinces told the Times, particularly on civilian casualties.

The crackdown has raised concerns among provincial officials that they may lose their jobs or be arrested. A spokesman, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said journalists often had to wait hours or days to hear from provincial governors because their spokesmen were not allowed to respond.

American officials and members of Mr. Ghani’s government attributed the action to a lack of coordination between local and national authorities, saying that provincial spokesmen are forbidden to speak only about security issues.

Sediq Seddiq, the spokesman for Mr Ghani, denied the government attempted to restrict information, saying the Afghan government was “a pioneer in supporting our vibrant media and enforcing access to information laws in the region are unparalleled “.

Ultimately, the Afghan government’s decision to suppress information at the local level means that the Taliban have more room to control the narrative in the districts of the country where they are present, but that Afghan officials have more control over the national narrative said a former US official.

This dynamic took place in southern Afghanistan on Sunday. Local officials in Nimruz province alleged an Afghan air strike there the day before killed at least a dozen civilians, only to learn from the governor that 12 Taliban had been killed and a civilian casualty report was being investigated. On the same day, protesters took the remains of those killed to the provincial capital, saying that women and children were among the dead.

The suppression of information was a boon to the Taliban, an insurgent group that once banned televisions and rarely spoke to reporters. According to experts, the February 29 agreement with the United States on a withdrawal timetable has helped legitimize the group at international level, fueling the Taliban’s public relations apparatus to grow significantly.

Taliban opinions in English are now widely published on the group’s website, Voice of Jihad, and sometimes appear in international news media, including the Op-Ed page of the New York Times. Local Afghan news agencies are posting statements by Taliban spokesmen on social media, similar to Afghan officials. It is a long way from a decade before when Taliban news was often dismissed as a lie.

The Taliban often lie about the death toll in their attacks, denying civilian casualties and sometimes blaming coalition forces for them. The group has declined to play a role in recent targeted killings across the country, despite being directly implicated by the US military and Afghan security officials.

Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban’s chief spokesman, said its media strategy focuses on “sharing the truth for the people.” In reality, the group has two options: one supports the peace talks and the other discredits the Afghan government on the battlefield and supports Taliban fighters.

To counter the Taliban’s narrative, the United States has set up a small psychological operations unit called the Information Warfare Task Force-Afghanistan, according to US military officials. The shady outfit was made at the request of Gen. Austin S. Miller, commander of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, following the assassination of Gen. Abdul Raziq, the Kandahar police chief, in 2018. After his death in an insider attack, rumors quickly attributed his killing to the Americans.

By combining cyber tools, intercepted communication and social media, the unit acts as an instant antipole to disrupt the news and information channels of the Taliban and terrorist groups in the country.

Mr. Hijri, the former provincial spokesman, still refuses to cover up the civilian victims he saw on October 22nd. A report by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission backed up its claims on the episode, saying that an Afghan government air strike killed nine children. aged 7 to 13 and wounded more than 14 others. Taliban fighters were also injured.

“I’m in the middle of two stones: one side is the Taliban and the other side is the government,” said Hijri. “Now my fate is not clear.”

Taimoor Shah reported from Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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What to Know as Troubled Afghan Peace Talks Enter a New Part

KABUL, Afghanistan – After four decades of fierce fighting in Afghanistan, peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban have at least opened the possibility that the long cycle of violence may one day end.

But that milestone is still a long way off. The most recent round of discussions, which started in September, was fraught with bureaucratic problems and months of debates on minor issues.

And although these talks resulted in an agreement on the principles and procedures that will guide the next round of peace negotiations, they came with a price. As the two sides met in Doha, Qatar, bloodshed on battlefields and in Afghan cities rose sharply.

Now that the peace talks are due to resume on January 5th, details of the next negotiations remain unclear.

While both the Afghan government and the Taliban have announced that they will not publicly publish their priority lists for the next round of negotiations, security analysts, researchers, and government and Taliban officials expect the following – and what hinders these talks must be overcome.

The ultimate goal of the negotiations is to establish a political roadmap for a future government. The head of the government’s negotiating team, Masoom Stanikzai, said Wednesday that a ceasefire would be the delegation’s top priority. The Taliban, who have leveraged attacks against security forces and civilians, are instead trying to negotiate a form of government based on strict Islamic laws before discussing a ceasefire.

However, it will not be easy to get to these larger fundamental questions as both sides continue to cling to the meanings of fundamental terms such as “ceasefire” and “Islamic”. There are many forms of ceasefire, from permanent and federal to partial and conditional, yet the public portion of the February US-Taliban agreement calling for the full withdrawal of American troops mentions but does not specifically mandate or fully define them how it should look.

The Taliban also refuse to specify what they mean by “Islamic” and the government’s insistence on an “Islamic” republic has been the subject of intense debate.

“The Taliban say they want an Islamic system, but they don’t specify which ones,” said Abdul Haific Mansoor, a member of the Afghan negotiating team, pointing out that there are almost as many systems as there are Islamic countries.

The next round of talks will also be made more difficult by the Taliban’s demand that the government release more Taliban prisoners. The government’s release of more than 5,000 prisoners removed the final barrier to negotiations in September, but President Ashraf Ghani has so far refused to release any more.

Both sides used the violence on the ground in Afghanistan as leverage during the Doha negotiations, but the Taliban have been more aggressive in their attacks than the government, whose troops tend to stay at bases and checkpoints to respond to sustained attacks.

According to a New York Times review, the number of security forces and civilians rose during the ongoing talks in the fall, before the Afghan government and Taliban negotiators announced in early December that they had reached an agreement on procedures for future talks had cold weather likely contributed to the decline as well. At least 429 pro-government forces were killed in September and at least 212 civilians were killed in October – the worst tolls in any category in more than a year.

“The killing and bloodshed have reached new heights,” said Atiqullah Amarkhel, a military analyst in Kabul. “What kind of will for peace is that?”

Ibraheem Bahiss, an independent Afghan research analyst, said the Taliban are pursuing two paths simultaneously: violence and negotiation.

“Your goal is to come to power and have a particular system of government,” said Bahiss. “Whether they achieve it through conversation or through fighting, both of them have costs that they are willing to bear.”

Although the Taliban have greatly reduced direct attacks on US forces since February, the insurgent group has relentlessly expanded the territory it controls by besieging local security forces.

In response, the Americans have launched air strikes where Afghan troops were under extreme stress during the Taliban’s attacks. One Taliban official said the level of violence in the group was direct response to air strikes from the United States or to military and poorly received diplomatic action by the Afghan government.

US air strikes this fall rescued the crumpled defenses of Afghan units in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, revealing deficiencies in Afghan ground and air forces that are under constant attack. US officials said the deteriorating morale of the armed forces has raised concerns about General Austin S. Miller, commander of the US-led mission in the country.

At the same time, the number of American troops dropped from around 12,000 in February to an estimated 2,500 by mid-January. A full withdrawal is planned by May, when the deal goes into effect. This has left Afghan officials unsure of how their forces can survive without American support.

The importance of the talks with the United States was underscored in November when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Doha and met with negotiators, and again in mid-December when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Mark A. Milley, did the same.

A Pentagon statement said General Milley urged the Taliban to “reduce violence immediately,” a term that American officials have used several times this year and that is open to a wide range of interpretations. US officials are trying to balance the battlefield.

Both sides are also waiting to see whether President-elect Joseph R. Biden Jr. will stick to the troop withdrawal schedule or possibly renegotiate the entire deal.

If Mr Biden decides to leave any remaining American anti-terrorist military force in Afghanistan after May 2021, as suggested by some US lawmakers, Mr Bahiss said, “The Taliban have made it clear that the entire deal would be void.”

In light of the allegations and suspicions in Doha, some Afghan analysts fear that talks could stall for months.

“The distrust between the two sides has increased violence, but nothing has been done to eradicate that distrust,” said Syed Akbar Agha, a former leader of the Taliban’s Jaish-ul Muslim group.

This could indefinitely delay serious attempts to address core government issues such as human rights, free press, rights for women and religious minorities, and democratic elections, among others.

Taliban negotiators have stated that they support women’s rights, for example, but only under strict Islamic law. Many analysts interpret this as the same harsh oppression of women practiced by the Taliban when they ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001.

The deeply divided government in Kabul also fears that the Taliban will try to shorten the time before all American forces depart, while the Taliban claim that Mr Ghani, who was re-elected in a bitterly controversial election last spring, stands still to serve out his five year tenure. If a form of national unity or an interim government were agreed, Mr Ghani would be unlikely to remain in office.

Another complication is the division within the Taliban, from stubborn commanders in Afghanistan to political negotiators in Doha’s hotels. Some Taliban factions believe they should fight and defeat the Americans and the Afghan government, not negotiate with them.

Mr. Agha, the former Taliban leader, said little progress was likely unless an impartial mediator emerged that could destroy the lack of confidence in Doha.

“If not,” he said, “I don’t think the next round of talks will end with a positive result.”

Some analysts fear an even more threatening result. Torek Farhadi, a former advisor to the Afghan government, said: “One thing is clear – without an agreement we are facing civil war.”

Najim Rahim, Fahim Abed and Fatima Faizi reported from Kabul.